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NOTES
EQUITY JURISDICTION-FREEDOM

OF THE PRESS-LIBEL-Since a

dicta of Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard" to the effect that equity will
not enjoin publication of a libel because such publication is a crime and
equity has no jurisdiction to prevent crimes,' equitable prevention of
12 Swanst. 402 (1818). There was some previous dicta supporting Lord Eldon's
statement, notably H'uggonson's Case, 2 Atk. 469; however there were also
previous decisions on that point to the contrary. Eldon's view was neither traditional nor backed by authority. For a good analysis see Pound, Equitable
Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harvard Law Rev.

640 (1916).
2

A libel is a civil offense, a tort, as well as a crime. Equity today finds no
difficulty in enjoining other torts which also happen to be crimes. Beck v.
Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1899) ; Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131
Mo. 212, 32 S.W. 1106 (1895) ; Davis v. Zimmnerman, 35 N.Y.S. 303 (1895).

NOTES

personal libels, as such,3 has been consistently denied, in the United
libelous matter is that such procedure would be unconstitutional. The
States at least. The first serious objection to equitable restraint of
federal constitution, as well as those of the various states, guarantees
freedom of speech and press ;4 whether or not this guarantee grants
freedom to libel is an open question. Blackstone, whose theories concerning the common law quite generally prevailed at the time the Bill
of Rights was adoptd in the United States, which merely ennunciated
among other things the common law doctrine of freedom of speech,
holds that freedom of the press consists in laying no previous restraints
on publication; everyone having the right to say what he pleases with
a corresponding liability, civil or criminal, for libelous or improper
matter when published.5
3 Equity restrains libels when such are incidental to an unlawful boycott or to

an unlawful intimidation of employees. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.
221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911) ; Einack v. Kane 34 F. 46 (N. D. Ill.)
(1888); Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union 51 F. 260 (C. C. Idaho)
(1892); Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union 45 F. 135 (1891); Seattle
Brewing Co. v. Hansen 144 F. 1011 (1906); Shoe Co. v. Saxey, supra 2;
Marx v. Watson 168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391 (1912) ; Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine etc. 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766 (1918) ; ParamountEnterprises
Inc. v. Mitchell 140 So. (Fla.) 328 (1932).
Als6 injunctions issue when such libelous publications are made for the
purposes of extortion, Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Myers, 140 Ill. App. 392 (1908) ;
contra, Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902),
or of intimidating plaintiff's customers by wrongful threats of infringement
suit, E-mack v. Kane, supra 3, Farquharv. Nat'l. Harrow Co. 102 F. 714 (C. C.
A.) (1900) ; Electric Renovator Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 F. 754 (1911) ;
Bell v. Singer Mfg. Co. 65 Ga. 452 (1880); Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper
Underwear Co. 210 F. 347 (1914), or of generally injuring or destroying
plaintiff's business, Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471,
35 N.E. 280 (1893); Reyer v. Middleton, 36 Fla. 99, 17 So. 937 (1895); Sherry
v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888); Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966,
48 So. 422 (1909). In the words of a recent case, Dehydro Inc. v. Tretolite Co.
53 F. (2) 273 (U. S. D. C. Okla.) (1931), "where the gravamen of the action
is to enjoin unfair competition, and the libel or slander is only incidental
thereto and does not characterize the action, an injunction will issue.:
Also libels are enjoined in contempt proceedings to insure proper administration of justice, Resp. v. Oswald, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 319 (1788) a leading case;
but see Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896).
4United States Constitution, Amendments, Article I.
Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 3. "Every person may freely speak,
write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." This part of the provision is similar to
those contained in the constitutions of other states.
54 Blackstone's Comm. 151-152, ed. Lewis (1902) this theory has been criticized
not only for denying all previous restraints, but also for allowing too wide a
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Another theory of freedom of the press is advanced by Cooley
who holds that the constitutional guarantee does not give one the right
to publish whatever he pleases, including libels, but only what is not
harmful in its character, when judged by such standards as the law
affords. 6 Under this interpretation previous restraints of libels would
7
not violate the Constitution.
In the United States Blackstone's theory has been chiefly urged in
dicta8 with the exception of Brandeth y. Lance,9 a case which, though

turning on this very point, assumes without citing any authority that
a previous restraint would infringe upon the liberty of the press. The
statement that equity will protect only property rights is also made in
this case; whatever is the fact or should be the fact ° is of little import
here. Although the right to a good reputation is personal, it is also a
right of substance." Infringement of that right through defamation
scope for tyranny and practical censorship through punishment for whatever
administrators or legislators might deem improper publications. Pound, supra
1 at p. 651; Hughes, C. J. in Near v. Minn. 283 U. S.697 at pp. 714-15;
Cooley, 2, Constitutional Limitations, 883-86, (8th ed.) (1927).
6 Cooley, 2 Constitutional Limitations, 883-86 (8th ed.) 1927.
7Pound, supra 1, at pp. 651-55, discusses this point thoroughly, arriving at the
conclusion that both tradition and reason dictate that equity in enjoining libels
will not violate the Constitution.
s Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304 at 313 (1866) ; Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 455 at 462 (1907) ; but see Brown, J. in Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U. S.275, (1896) quoted by Pound, supra 1, at p. 651 in footnote
29.
98 Paige 24, 34 A. D. 368 (1839). This case has been followed; Marlin Fire
Arms Co. v. Shields, supra 3; Howell v. Bee Publishing Co., 100 Neb. 39, 158
N.W. 358 (1916). For a criticism of the case see Pound, supra 1, at p. 649
et sequentia.
20 It is true that today this position is losing ground; it came into existence
through another dicta of Lord Eldon in the same case of Gee v. Pritchard,which
case nevertheless protected by injunction a personal right. Personal rights, as
such or disguised, are protected by equity courts; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115
La. 479, 39 So. 449, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1147 (1905) ; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72
N.J.E. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) ; Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.E. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929) ;
Bazeinore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). There is no
reason why a threatened libel should not be subject to the same equitable
relief as other threatened torts, Walsh on Equity (1930) pp. 132-88 and 213-51.
If equity could practicably enjoin negligence, it probably would do it; unfortunately such a course is impossible by reason of forces outside the court's
control. Such difficulties are not present in libel cases; equity can practicably
enjoin threatened defamation.
" Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harvard Law Rev. 343 (1915) at p. 349
and pp. 445-53. Malins, V. C., in Dixen v. Holden, L.R. 7 Eq. 488, quoted at
p. 647, Pound, supra 1, says: "What is property? One man has property in
lands, another in goods, another in business, another in skill, another in reputation; and whatever may have the effect of destroying property in any one
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invariably involves economic loss to the person defamed; equity will
protect an individual's business or occupation or other substantial
rights of property, 12 and a personal libel brings with it as an inevitable
condition, disparagement of property.
The essence of freedom of the press is surely not the absence of all
previous restraint ;13 it is rather the freedom to publish what is lawful
in its character. No one should be allowed to complain in a court of
law that he is being deprived of a Constitutional right when he is prevented from libeling another and deliberately destroying that person's
good name. However, in a recent case Blackstone's theory was invoked
by the Federal Supreme Court 14 to declare unconstitutional a state
statute providing injunctive relief against all newspapers or other publications becoming a nuisance through habitual publishing of scandalous, obscene, and defamatory matter. It is probably true that policy
demands that such legislative interference be deemed an infringement
of these things (even in a man's good name) is, in my opinion, destroying
property of a most valuable description. But here it is distinctly sworn to,
and cannot be denied, that the effect of this will be seriously damaging to
the plaintiff's business of a merchant.
"Now the business of a merchant is about the most valuable kind of property that he can well have. Here it is the source of his property. But I go
further, and say if it had only injured his reputation, it is within the jurisdiction of this Court to stop the publication of a libel of this description which
goes to destroy his property or his reputation, which is his property, and if
possible, more valuable than other property."
12 Walsh on Equity (1930) pp. 213-51; InternationalNews Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. (1918) where it is said that equity "treats
any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right." contra: Boston
Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 fass. 69, 19 Am. Rep. 310 (1873) which
states that equity has no jurisdiction over cases of libel or slander, or of false
representations as to the character or quality of the plaintiff's property, or
as to his title thereto, which involved no breach of trust or of contract. The
decision is founded upon Blackstone's theory and upon authority which is
clearly dicta, rejecting without fair discussion the only real authority in existence. Pound, supra 1, at pp. 658-61.
13 We have seen, supra 3, that libels incidental to other harmful acts or effects
are restrained w;ithout the thought that such restraint infringes on the liberty
of speech or press. Pound, supra 1, at pp. 652-53, lists four main instances
where libels are restrained, (1) intimidating publications; (2) immoral or indecent publications; (3) publications interfering with the course of justice;
(4) publications dangerous to the conduct of military operations during war.
The Federal Supreme Court seemed definitely to reject Blackstone's theory in
upholding prosecutions under the Espionage Act during the World War.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919); Walsh on
Equity, p. 265, note 13. For a criticism of the court's stand see Willis, Freedom
of Speech and Press, 4 Ind. Law J. 445 (1929); 31 Col. Law Rev. 1148 (1931).
14 Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
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of the freedom of the press; there would be too much room for abuse.' 5
Chief Justice Hiughes, in writing the majority opinion, admitted that
there could not be an absolute absence of all previous restraint 16 and
expressly limited the decision to a denial of previous restraints imposed
by statutes such as the one in question 7 by stating that the court is
not "concerned with questions as to the extent of authority to prevent
publications in order to protect private rights according to the princi8
ples governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity.'
With this re-assurance, and considering the tendency of courts, particularly of recent years, to restrain libels when incidental to other
property damage, it probably could be said that no constitutional provisions forbid a court in a civil case to restrain threatened publication
or republication of what is clearly libelous as "judged by such standards as the law affords."
The second serious objection " to enjoining libelous matter centers
around the question of jury trials. It is a well settled policy in the
20
United States to try the truth of defamatory statements by a jury.
This should cause no difficulty; if there is a question as to whether
certain published matter, further publication of which is threatened,
is libelous or not, the jury can still be the proper instrument of determination. If they find it to be a libel, the court should enjoin further
publication. 2' Or, if the jury finds that certain matter, which the
defendant, intends to publish, would, if published, be libelous, the court
should enjoin such intended publication. Or, if the plaintiff seeks a
15 For a good discussion of this case and the principles involved see 31 Col. Law
Rev. 1148 (1931) ; also 14 Minn. Law Rev. 787 (1930) ; 17 Corn. Law Q. 126
(1931).
16 Citing the exceptions noted in 13 supra.
'7 Commented on in 31 Col. Law Rev. 1148 at p. 1155. The statute, Mason's 1927
Minn. Statutes, Sec. 10123 (1), was held constitutional by the state court.
174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770 (1928) ; 14 Minn. Law Rev. 787.
's 283 U. S.697 at p. 716.
19 There are other objections, chiefly traditional equity procedure that (1) only
property rights will be protected, and (2) that personal libels do not come
under this heading. See note 10 supra.
20 Pound, supra 1, at pp. 656-57. This is true where the action is at law for
damages for a libel already published; but where the restraint of a threatened
libel is sought, the jurisdiction is clearly that of equity, and the defendant
has no right to a jury. When equity enjoins a public nuisance, the defendant
has no right to a jury even though the public nuisance in question also happens to be a crime. State exrel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078
(1907) ; Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55 (1889).
21 Equity will restrain further publication of what has already been established
as a libel in an action at law. Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo.
492, 16 L.R.A. 243 (1892) ; Wolf v. Harris,267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916),
dicta to that effect.
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restraining order or temporary injunction for certain libelous matter
which the defendant intends to publish for the first time or continue
publishing, an injunction should issue only where such matter, as
determined by the court, is so clearly libelous that if a jury later did
not so find, the court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable.22
As a practical matter in many of the cases seeking injunction, the
libelous character of the threatened publication is palpable or else
admitted ;23 no jury is needed in such cases and the judge should
enjoin without hesitation. Actually then, the well settled policy of the
law is not altered by allowing injunctions in the cases set out above;
no one is deprived of any rights he has under the jury trial nor is he
subjected to the possibility of judicial tyranny unless such person is
a subscriber to the absurd proposition that it is subversive of American
ideals to entrust to the discretion of the judiciary any of the people's
sacred and inalienable rights.

24

Since 191625 apparently no court in the United States has made any
definite move either by its action or its statements, to advance the
proposition that equity can and should enjoin personal libels when the
facts warrant equitable relief ;26 but on the contrary many of them
22 This is the rule in England, Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; Monson
v. Tussaud's Ltd., (1894) 1 Q.B. 671. In Bonnard v. Perrymnan it was decided
that equity has jurisdiction to enjoin libels because of the uniting of the common law and equity systems, giving law courts power to grant injunctions in
,all personal actions of contract or tort and equity courts power to hear all
actions. It is suggested that the Codes of the various states are open to the
same interpretation. Walsh on Equity, pp. 265-66.
23
Pound, supra 1, at p. 657.
24
Pound, supra 1, at p. 664, footnote 69, says, "It has been suggested that if
injunctions were allowed in libel cases, a judicial censorship of the press
would result under which one might be punished in a contempt proceeding
for publishing an article that was not libelous. There may be a miscarriage of
justice in spite of every safeguard. We must inevitably run certain risks in the
administration of justice. But if such injunctions are granted only where
there is a legal cause of action for defamation or for malicious disparagement
of property, (2) there is a case for equity jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the legal remedy, and (3) there is clearly a libel or a malicious
false statement so that there is no substantial call for jury trial, it would seem
that review of the decree by an appellate tribunal ought to insure against the
evils feared. If not, we may as well revert to the methods of colonial America
and cut off all equity jurisdiction for fear of judicial tyranny."
25 The date when Dean -Pound wrote his excellent essay on the subject. He asserted, in summing up, his confidence that presently some strong court would
ennunciate the rule that equity has jurisdiction in libel cases.
26 There are some twelve cases denying in dicta the right of equity to restrain
libelous publications; yet many of these cases actually restrain such publication where there is unfair competition, injury to business in labor
disputes, conspiracies, etc. Trade libels are no different from personal
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have repeated, it seems almost without thinking, that unfortunate dicta
of Lord Eldon. Certainly the whole question of reputation is peculiar
in this, that society offers no adequate compensation for its loss. Unlike
converted personal property, something similar or equivalent to it cannot be purchased with money, nor can it be restored like other matters
of substance by the person who has wrongfully taken it. Reputation
is necessary for a man to live as befits his nature; injury to it results
often in irreparable damage to the individual's personal, economic,
and social life. For that reason society owes an urgent duty to preserve
it for the individual. Adequate protection can only be given by preventing the cause of damage; money damages are altogether inadequate, just as they are in the case of unique chattels. Today, will some
court say that a good name, and honor in the community, merit equitable protection ?27

RADIO BROADCASTING--LIBEL AND SLANDER-JOINT TORT FEASORS

-There is always a certain amount of time elapsing between the enactment of a new law and its interpretation by the court, and the case of
the Radio Act of 19271 is no exception to the rule. Five years after the
passage of this law we find the first interpretation of one of its section, 2 by the supreme court of the state of Nebraska. The court was
provided with an opportunity in Sorenson v. Wood 3 to extend, by analogy, the law of slander and libel to a virgin soil, that of the field of
radio broadcasting. A brief review of the above case shows a radio
station being joined as a joint tort feasor with a political speaker who
libels in respect to the right of publication; the constitutional guarantee
should apply to both. A libelous attack on a man's business will
be prevented; but what is more fundamental, a libelous attack on the
man's own good name, will not, it seems, be prevented. Ex parte Tucker,
110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920) directly denied equity jurisdiction as being
unconstitutional; but Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 233 (1924)
granted an injunction for slander, distinguishing its decision from the preceding case on the grounds of intimidation, (no property right, other than that
of good name, was involved in the case). Northern Wis. Co-operative Tobacco
Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571 197 N.W. 936 (1924) restrained oral solicitations injuring business. John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 242 N.W. (Wis.) 576 (1932)
evaded a direct decision on the question upon technical grounds, but asserted
that there may be limitations on the right to speak, citing in particular State
ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770, 58 A.L.R. 607 (1928)
and Near v. Minn, ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
27 See Chafee, Freedom of the Press, for further discussion of the constitutional
aspect of the question.
'Feb. 23, 1927 C. 169 § 18, 44 Stat. 1170.
2 47 United States Court of Appeals § 98, 44 Stat. 1170.
3243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932).

